Tiffany Kwok
Mahtab Laghaei
COMMENTARY
By: Tiffany Kwok and Mahtab Laghaei
Demember 2024
Word count: 984
Recent allegations of Indian state interference in Canada’s sovereign affairs has been centred around the shocking killing of a Sikh national in British Columbia. The investigation has also surfaced new allegations of other efforts to interfere in Canadian democratic politics. The issue of foreign interference has been more of a slow burn over the past few years, since revelations from the 2021 election surfaced efforts to mislead and sway opinion about targeted political candidates.
In September 2023, a public inquiry, chaired by Justice Hogue, was launched in response to investigate foreign interference, publishing an initial report finding no significant impact on the overall results of Canada’s elections. Nevertheless, Canadians are concerned – with more than two-thirds surveyed in 2022 believing that disinformation threatens our democracy.
Canadians are not the only ones concerned. A CIGI-Ipsos’ Global Survey in 2019 shows that the spread of disinformation has long been able to shape public opinion, and undermine trust in mainstream media and government.
How are foreign actors able to meddle in the outcome of our elections and democracy? By spreading false facts about major political figures and geopolitical events, they are able to influence the public perspective on different issues, how we vote, and gradually reduce trust in government. With the rise of sophisticated technologies—particularly generative AI-based tools— fake content online is only getting more difficult to detect, further increasing the rising threat of foreign interference.
The government must act quickly to reduce the potential damage of outside influence on our sovereignty. The best defense? According to findings from a workshop of disinformation researchers and civil society stakeholders the Dais brought together earlier this year, efforts must be focussed on keeping Canadians informed of foreign-driven disinformation campaigns that may be lurking on the web.
Foreign disinformation campaigns can slowly eat away at public trust, and spotting them isn’t always easy. Digital influence campaigns are active across a number of elections this year, including interference in the U.S. election. The recent discovery of Reliable Recent News (RRN)—a website operating as part of a Russian disinformation operation consisting of inaccurate articles about Canadian politics is one example.
Canada’s existing information-sharing capacities are falling short. While federal government measures like SITE (Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections) task force and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) alert political parties of relevant cases of outside interference, most Canadians are not aware of how pervasive these threats are. Justice Hogue’s commission shows that information about foreign interference collected by authorities has not been reaching the right people in government, nor actually used to fix the problem.
Beyond the occasional RRM announcement and fact sheets on online influence activities, there are no measures to protect everyday Canadians who rely on social media for news. Although the impacts from influence operations in the information ecosystem may be gradual, the erosion of public trust as a result of an information vacuum–where an absence of information creates space for rumours and speculation–—demands for access to accurate and timely information.
The recently published list of Canada’s intelligence priorities is a good first step. It shares information on Russia’s disinformation efforts, and states Canadian officials’ commitment to informing industry and the public of information threats. The National Cyber Threat Assessment also very clearly calls out state adversaries using cyber operations to “disrupt and divide,” including campaigns to intimidate and shape public opinion.
From our conversations with experts, we suggest three strategies that should drive the federal approach to informing the public:
Build trust with various affected communities early. This is especially the case for groups in Canada who are made more vulnerable, like immigrants who may have previously come from countries that had not had free and fair elections, thus having a lower trust in authorities. A recent survey of 2,500 Canadian adults found that levels of trust in public libraries, friends and family, and schools remain relatively high as information sources on digital literacy. Noting these high levels of trust, tapping into existing civil society initiatives and trusted local networks, including public libraries can be another promising avenue to reach Canadians across the country.
Governments should review the threshold of what can be shared with the public, to be able to keep residents informed and any affected communities whenever is possible. France’s VIGINUM, a government agency dedicated to openly sharing data on digital interference offers an approach to information sharing through “detecting, characterizing, condemning and widely publicizing such campaigns.” A similar approach to VIGINUM can be taken in Canada by expanding the frequency and detail shared by the existing Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM). Regular sharing of information is not just important to the public, but for all those who work in this space to combat foreign disinformation attacks.
Collect individual- and community-level data on their awareness, understanding, and experiences of mis- and disinformation. This will allow for a better understanding of foreign disinformation, optimal avenues for information sharing, and a closer look at all targeted vulnerable groups. Without a data-informed approach to information sharing, all efforts going forward will be ineffective. Proceeding into the next election period with our current approaches to information sharing will leave the general population in the dark on foreign actors’ influence activities in their information ecosystems.
Though the benefits of information sharing are clear, experts also shared real concerns about the reporting of sensitive information, such as risks to national security for disclosing intelligence, and the potential for innocent Canadians who come from countries engaging in disinformation to be racially targeted.
This can be avoided through increased transparency, regular bottom-up engagement with affected communities like diaspora groups, and efforts to determine the best delivery avenue and message-bearer for this type of information, with cultural awareness, community needs, and risk sensitivities in mind.
Guarding our democracy requires proactive measures. Canadians’ trust must be built up far before the election period – the time to be transparent about the ongoings of our online information ecosystem is now.