Building Democratic Resilience to Foreign Disinformation in Canada

Executive Summary

In March and April 2024, the Dais organized a two-part workshop with over 40 participants from academia, civil society, government, and industry. These workshops aimed to bring experts together to discuss the threat from foreign disinformation today. The workshop also considered opportunities to advance evidence-informed solutions for building democratic resilience in Canada.

From the beginning of the workshop, participants debated the ability to define and identify “foreign disinformation,” emphasizing the need to differentiate between a spectrum of activities, tactics and threat actors. They also acknowledged the complex web of online interactions, often blurring the origins of false content. These challenges set the scene for the remainder of the discussions, where participants deliberated the issues and associated opportunities at each level.

The workshop discussions were organized into three sections: the first to address Canadians’ experiences with foreign disinformation at the citizen level; the second to examine the ways in which civil society and businesses are involved in combatting foreign disinformation; and the third to discuss the decisions that governments and institutions must make when combatting foreign interference, along with opportunities they may have to enhance information-sharing and build public trust.

Participants collectively expressed the need for coordinated, multi-level approaches at the citizen, civil society and business, and government and institution level.

At the citizen level, opportunities identified included:

• Collecting more individual- and community-level data, to better understand experiences of foreign disinformation through online and offline media, including nuances in susceptibility to disinformation, and to take a closer look at all targeted vulnerable groups beyond just diaspora communities.
• Pre-bunking (building preemptive resilience), cultivating “good and accurate” information, and expanding evidence-based civic education initiatives as avenues to empower and build the digital literacy capacity of communities.
• Collaborating with trusted actors like doctors, scientists, and online influencers, in addition to framing digital-literacy education programming as opportunities to build on other skills to make citizen-level initiatives more approachable and well-received.

At the civil society and business level, opportunities identified included:

• Bolstering protection for academics, journalists, and civil society in the form of legal support and related costs, a support or ombudsperson function to support victims of harassment, and a renewed approach for law enforcement to take online threats more seriously.
• Learning lessons from civil-society efforts in jurisdictions further ahead in their development of resilience to foreign interference than Canada. These include efforts developed in countries such as Estonia, Finland, and Taiwan.
• Requiring additional transparency from online platforms to assess effectiveness of measures for platform governance that would address disinformation, such as fact-checking and labelling initiatives, or restrictions on automated content and paid advertising.

At the government and institution level, opportunities identified included:

• Reviewing the threshold for governments to share information with the public or affected communities regarding information attacks, in order to encourage more open sharing where possible.
• Introducing an annual threat assessment of foreign disinformation, to pre-bunk emerging issues, and keep governments and institutions informed of threats facing the country.
• Reviewing vulnerabilities that have been exploited by foreign disinformation campaigns abroad, in order to apply lessons in Canada.

KEY THEME 1

Citizen level

This section focuses on Canadians’ experiences with foreign disinformation, and offers potential opportunities to combat and build resilience against disinformation at the level of the citizen.

Diaspora communities in Canada have long been the targets of foreign interference campaigns by nation-state actors. Disinformation, the popularized use of online platforms, and historical distrust of authorities have become avenues for interference by foreign actors to create campaigns targeting specific vulnerable communities. The heavy reliance and higher levels of trust that some diaspora communities have on content circulating within private communication channels, like WeChat and WhatsApp, pose particular challenges to identifying and combatting such disinformation.15 

The development of culturally-relevant measures to reach targeted communities requires a deeper understanding of different communities’ experiences with foreign interference. Efforts to address disinformation must take into account the needs and experiences of these communities or they may face potentially negative consequences.

As in the cases of disinformation and information manipulation campaigns targeting MP Michael Chong and former MP Kenny Chiu, malicious foreign actors seek to discourage targeted MPs from political participation, to pollute public discourse, and to ultimately undermine democratic participation.16 Without culturally- and linguistically-relevant information sources, diaspora community members risk difficulties in forming accurate and authentic political opinions. This risks that they will accept false information as truth, deterring citizens from participating in elections and other democratic processes.

Foreign disinformation efforts have also sought to influence democratic discourse and public opinion in Canada amongst the broad citizenry. One example of these efforts relates to Russia’s lengthy disinformation campaign, from influencing discourse around vaccine hesitancy and anti-lockdown narratives during the COVID-19 pandemic, to disinformation around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.17 

Three potential opportunities to address the threat of foreign disinformation at the citizen level are identified.

Collect more data to understand communities’ experiences with foreign interference.

First, conduct research and seek out local engagement to better understand communities that experience foreign interference, plus explore the underlying factors that contribute to the spread of false and misleading information. While existing research highlights increased potential susceptibility due to factors like historical and contemporary traumas, as well as identity-based appeals, more data needs to be collected to understand the nuances in this susceptibility, and to inform any future approaches to combat disinformation.

Beyond diaspora communities, workshop participants raised the need to explore other targeted vulnerable groups — namely those who may have traditionally lower trust in institutions. Participants brought up the Freedom Convoy and COVID-19 conspiracy communities in Canada as examples of such groups. Participants also pointed to the importance of developing a better understanding the role of content creators and social media influencers in spreading mis- and disinformation. Research shows that influence and engagement is unequal, with the top 10 percent of social media accounts generating approximately 93 percent of engagement on major platforms.18 Results also reveal that doctors and scientists are the most trusted information providers, warranting greater investigation into how to leverage these trustworthy figures.

Participants also discussed the relative availability of aggregate data, as opposed to individual-level data, highlighting the need to better understand individuals’ interactions with social media and disinformation. While aggregate data may be able to provide broad, high-level insights into different community groups’ experiences on social media, individual-level data can highlight linguistic, cultural, and habitual nuances within communities that may not otherwise be captured in group-level data. Collecting and using both individual and aggregate data would provide the insights to create multi-levelled solutions to combatting disinformation. Participants also discussed how Canada’s proposed Online Harms Act creates new regulatory obligations for online platforms to provide transparent information and access to data for research, but that the scope is limited to the narrow categories of illegal content, rather than disinformation.

Participants also suggested looking at local news sources that connect diaspora communities to their countries of origin as a way to gain a better understanding of international discourse on issues, although some voiced the need to distinguish between malicious interference and simple social engagement between people. Participants also recommended looking beyond traditionally researched social media platforms, to online tools such as private messaging platforms, gaming platforms, and podcasts.

Track and analyze outcomes of community organizations’ work to combat disinformation.

Second, seek to better understand the outcomes of community organizations’ work to combat disinformation. This can be done through program and/or community evaluations of those who receive funding through the Digital Citizen Contribution Program, or the Digital Literacy Exchange Program. As part of these funding opportunities, organizations have developed a variety of learning materials, public awareness programs and tools, and civic literacy campaigns. Assessing users of these products for their improved understanding and digital know-how can be one way to identify whether these programs and tools have been effective, and to identify remaining gaps.

One workshop participant shared the need to collect success stories coming from existing programs to understand why they worked, in order to implement these elements into future initiatives. Others noted the challenge of building long-term impact-tracking into what are often one-year grants. Others expressed the need to protect community members’ privacy as an utmost priority when analyzing all tracking and outcomes. This was mentioned specifically with respect to organizations working in communities that held lower levels of trust in governments, as they may feel uncomfortable with sharing their insights and data, even if the results aid improvements in programming.

Efforts can also be made to identify cultural community organizations that may not have received funding, but who are doing work to combat disinformation in their communities. Collecting outcomes-based data can also contribute to improving future iterations of disinformation interventions and digital-literacy programming to targeted populations. While research has shown that improving digital literacy can support users’ discernment of accurate information from false, it remains unclear how long this impact lasts, and whether it prevents users from sharing false information online.19 As a result, greater attention should also be paid to users’ abilities and their online interactions over time.

Educate and equip Canadians with the tools and abilities to think critically and identify disinformation.

Third, applying the insights from the efforts above, expand communications with Canadians of all ages on the topic of foreign disinformation, equipping individuals with the tools and education to think critically and identify disinformation. Culturally-relevant and relatable public education, plus digital literacy in languages beyond English and French may be particularly important to reaching vulnerable communities. Supporting grassroots initiatives like community websites Factchequeado and Auntie Betty, as well as local organizations, will expand the reach of digital-literacy education to people outside of the formal education system.20 Any initiatives and materials should be co-created with diaspora community members to achieve full impact and to build trust in democratic institutions. Participants also suggested the need to market digital-literacy programming initiatives to citizens as opportunities to build on other skills, to avoid scams, and to engage trusted actors like influencers and celebrities to build citizen resilience at a larger scale.

Workshop participants emphasized the need to empower and build capacity within communities rather than purely relying on regulation, offering the option to pre-bunk and inoculate against mis- and disinformation to build up digitally-literate citizens. Discussions also mentioned the ultimate need for expanded civic education, and a greater focus in cultivating “good and accurate” information, rather than just combatting false information, to rebuild trust in institutions.

In contrast, some participants voiced their skepticism around the effectiveness of education and expanded communications as a sole approach, pointing to the tactics of cognitive overload that are foreign-state actors use on social media. Participants explained that the crowding out of the information space leads to information apathy and paralysis, and alluded the ways in which “dark” and catchy news and content can overpower educational efforts. Others pointed to the roots of cognitive overload through the concepts of fourth- and fifth-generation psychological warfare, aiming to create distrust in experts, scientists, and institutions.

KEY THEME 3

Government and institution level

This section discusses the decisions that governments must make when combatting foreign interference, along with opportunities to enhance information-sharing and build public trust.

Democratic institutions grapple with the challenges of maintaining transparency with citizens by disclosing known foreign interference threats, while still protecting the public from risks of privacy infringement, for example, by focusing analysis only on open-source materials, and maintaining classified intelligence sources gathering threats from abroad. This is done with acknowledgment of the difficulties around drawing clear lines between foreign and domestic disinformation, given the nature of the information ecosystem. The reach of foreign information influence also extends beyond verifiable disinformation through, for example, information pollution and amplification of subjective disagreements that have far-reaching impacts on individual perceptions and trust of the information environment. The Government of Canada has made recent moves to increase transparency, including consultations on a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, as well as amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to enable greater disclosure of information to those outside the Government of Canada.35

Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) has shared cases of detected information operations including the probable “spamouflage” campaign in 2023, in which bot networks targeted MPs across Canada on Facebook and X.36 Scholars have looked at Russia’s role in the Freedom Convoy, while other scholars have shared their own experiences of foreign disinformation while attempting to conduct a political campaign.37 Regardless of the forum in which intelligence and reports of disinformation have been shared, information-sharing remains an important act of transparency to enable counter-measures such as inoculation warnings and to build public trust between the government and Canadians.

We identify three key opportunities for democratic institutions to respond to the threats of foreign disinformation.

Review the threshold for governments to share information with the public or impacted communities regarding information attacks, to the extent possible.

Governments can review the threshold to share information with the public regarding information attacks, to encourage more open sharing to the extent possible, particularly when filling information vacuums. Workshop participants noted the need for more context to be provided when intelligence is shared, in efforts to better inform citizens who would likely be unfamiliar with an issue’s global or historical context. The importance of the format in which intelligence is communicated was also raised in discussions, due to the need to both build and leverage citizen trust in reliable sources. VIGINUM, a government agency dedicated to publishing official content with the aim of detecting and characterizing foreign digital interference in France, was raised as a relevant example.38 However, some participants contested whether governments would even want to be more transparent and noted there would be difficulty in setting these thresholds in a non-partisan manner, particularly with respect to disinformation on sensitive political topics.

Through RRM reports, the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, and other intelligence on foreign mis- and disinformation, governments should continually revisit their methodologies and thresholds both for ethical monitoring and reporting. Acknowledging both the benefits and consequences of encrypted messaging, workshop participants stated the need to maintain strong encryption and to seek alternate means to collect intelligence, such as metadata, open-source information, transparency reports from private platforms, and direct engagement and surveying.

Forecast for and create action plans to proactively respond to potential negative side-effects associated with disclosures of foreign interference.

Beyond monitoring and reporting, governments can also forecast for and create proactive action plans in the case of potential negative side-effects associated with disclosures of foreign disinformation. Participants raised the need for government interventions to be mindful, ensuring that any interventions do not become an act of interference for democratic processes like elections. This was mentioned particularly in relation to the challenges that security and intelligence agencies can encounter through the ways in which intelligence is collected, to ensure these methods do not directly or indirectly impact election outcomes.

Workshop participants also suggested that both an annual threat assessment of foreign disinformation and regular information ecosystem updates be introduced, similar to or as part of the National Cyber Threat Assessment. This would be a proactive effort on the government’s part to pre-bunk emerging issues, reduce chances of issues being sensationalized, and keep governments and institutions at all levels informed of threats facing the country in greater detail than is currently available.

Review vulnerabilities that have been exploited by foreign disinformation campaigns abroad to apply lessons in Canada.

Foreign disinformation campaigns also exploit increased polarization and deepening of existing social cleavages to target and exploit divisions in Canada. Governments and public institutions should also take the opportunity to review existing vulnerabilities, rather than only focus on known threats. Similar to the examination of the Freedom Movement by the Public Order Emergency Commission, other social cleavages can be likewise analyzed to inform future preparatory measures.39 An extended, cross-departmental review of the possible threats from violent extremism driven by politics, religion and ideology noted in the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force’s June 2023 report may be a good starting point.40

International examples of exploited divisions include Russian campaigns to sow discord among racial and religious groups, leveraging the Black Lives Matter movement, and religious tensions following former US President Trump’s inflammatory statements.41 Participants also mentioned the MAGA movement in the United States, pointing out its organic nature in organizing, not driven solely by disinformation campaigns. Other participants noted Chinese campaigns targeting Hong Kong democracy protestors, and Indian campaigns targeting farmer protests, in efforts to discredit individuals and their movements.42

One participant was able to reflect upon their personal experience interacting with protestors at the Freedom Convoy, in hopes of understanding their perspectives and engaging in conversation. Other participants pointed to engaging with newcomers as soon as they arrive in Canada, equipping individuals to think critically, provide accurate information about Canadian institutions and media, and to address any potential distrust of the Canadian government.

By proactively analyzing tensions both online and offline, transparently working with and genuinely dialoguing with community groups, and resourcing and responding to community needs, institutions have the chance to build public trust and increase resilience to future threats.